



# ADP 3-07

## STABILITY

**AUGUST 2012**

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## **Stability**

1. This change replaces the introductory figure.
2. ADP 3-07, 31 August 2012, is changed as follows:

**Remove Old Pages**

**Insert New Pages**

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Pages ii and iii

Pages ii and iii

3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

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**15 February 2013**

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# STABILITY

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\*This manual supersedes chapters 1, 2, and 4 of FM 3-07, dated 6 October 2008.



# Preface

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07 is the Army's doctrine for stability tasks. ADP 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting these operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrinal publications. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. See Figure 1 on page iv.

The principal audience for ADP 3-07 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of major and above, who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It also applies to the civilian leadership of the Army. This manual is also intended to serve as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to better understand the role of the military in broader reconstruction and stabilization efforts.


Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. See Field Manual (FM) 27-10.

ADP 3-07 implements the standardization agreement entitled Allied Joint Publication-3.4.

ADP 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent publication (the authority) have an asterisk in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADP 3-07 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 3-07 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Center, U.S. Army War College. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to the preparing agency through Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ADP 3-07), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil); or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.



**Figure 1. Stability underlying logic**

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This ADP first introduces stability, including the stability principles. It discusses stability in unified land operations, including the primary Army stability tasks. Then the publication discusses unique considerations for stability across the range of military operations. The ADP concludes with a discussion of planning for stability in operations.

## **INTRODUCTION TO STABILITY IN OPERATIONS**

1. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.
2. Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, which usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the priority grievance. Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal functioning of society where the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.
3. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions.

## **STABILITY PRINCIPLES**

4. Across the range of military operations, Army units use the principles of stability with the principles of joint operations to carry out stability tasks. Effective commanders better understand the joint principles in the context of stability as part of decisive action and in the context of how to use the principles.
5. *Stability tasks* are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability tasks are based on principles that lay the foundation for long-term stability:
  - Conflict transformation.
  - Unity of effort.

- Legitimacy and host-nation ownership.
- Building partner capacity.

## Conflict Transformation

6. Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. The process of conflict transformation reduces the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations. It aims to set the host nation on a sustainable, positive trajectory in which transformational processes directly address the dynamics causing instability or violent conflict. Conflict transformation is based on identifying and mitigating the root causes of conflict and instability while simultaneously building the capacity of local institutions to prevent future instability.

## Unity of Effort

7. Success in stability tasks requires all actors to work toward a common goal (see figure 2). Military operations typically demand unity of command, challenging military and civilian leaders to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. For U.S. military forces, this is the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). *Unity of effort* is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Effective civilian-military teaming starts with the development of shared goals, aims, and objectives—a unity of purpose—that lead to a relationship of shared trust and a unity of effort becomes possible.




Figure 2. Comprehensive approach to stability

8. Many actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations, participate in unified action at their own discretion. They often define their roles with incongruent interests and mandates. Commanders overcome the challenge and facilitate a shared understanding among the U.S. forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, international actors, multinational actors, and nongovernmental organizations.

### *A Whole-of-Government Approach*

9. A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole-of-government approach enables achieving a balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforces progress made by one of the instruments of national power while fostering success among the others. It relies on interagency coordination among agencies of the USG, including the Department of Defense. Such an approach ensures that military forces can leverage, synchronize, and focus all available capabilities on addressing the drivers of conflict and reinforcing local institutions to facilitate sustainable peace.

10. All actors involved in unified action integrate with the operation from the onset of planning. Together, they complete detailed analyses of the situation and operational environments, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation. Integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole-of-government approach has challenges. First, the efforts have differing capacities and differing perspectives. Second, the two efforts use different approaches and decisionmaking processes.

11. The cultures in civilian agencies differ from those of military forces, such as their organization capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decisionmaking processes. The USG organizations work to integrate differing civilian and military efforts with unstated assumptions or interpretations of events, and their solutions. A successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors—

- Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.
- Share an understanding of the situation and a problem to be resolved.
- Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
- Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
- Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their common goals.
- Allocate resources to ensure continued information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts.

### *A Comprehensive Approach*

12. A comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Successful operations use this approach, even for those operations involving actors participating at their own discretion or present but not acting as a

member of a coalition. Integration and collaboration among actors with different agendas and experience proves challenging. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. Mandates, experiences, structures, and bureaucratic cultures make it difficult to sustain a comprehensive approach. Commanders overcome and mitigate this challenge with extensive cooperation and coordination. See figure 2 on page 2.

## **Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership**

13. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. Legitimacy is central to stability tasks and has two key aspects, legitimacy and authority that the host-nation government can exercise, and the legitimacy of the operation.

14. The legitimacy of the host nation depends on the successful interplay of four factors: mandate, manner, consent, and expectation. Mandate is the perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes the authority of the host nation. This can result from universal suffrage, religious authority, or a recognized and accepted caste or tribal model. Manner is the perceived legitimacy in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively. Consent is the extent to which factions, local populations, neighboring states, the international community and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance to freely given support. Expectation is the extent to which those exercising the mandate manage or meet the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations, and others.

## **Building Partner Capacity**

15. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, rule of law, essential services, governance, economic development, and other critical government functions. Army forces support host-nation ownership when planning and implementing capacity building as part of a comprehensive approach. Unified action to enhance the ability of partners for security, rule of law, essential services, governance, economic development and other critical government functions exemplifies building partner capacity.

16. Building host-nation institutional capacity is fundamental to success. The process of building partner capacity creates an environment that fosters the host nation, community participation, and human development. It includes efforts to improve governance, political inclusion, and broad societal engagements. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, capacity building is a long-term, continuing process in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation's human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

## **NATIONAL STRATEGY**

17. The body of security strategy that shapes the conduct of operations featuring stability tasks includes the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy of the United States of America (known as the National Military Strategy), the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

## **DEFENSE POLICY**

18. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 establishes policy that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense prepares to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. DODI 3000.05 emphasizes that host-nation, foreign, or USG civilian personnel best perform many stability tasks executed during unified land operations with military forces providing support as required. The directive also states that, in the event civilians are not prepared to perform those tasks, the Department of Defense prepares to lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance. The Department of Defense leads these activities until it can to transition lead responsibility to other USG agencies, foreign government and security forces, or international governmental organizations.

## **FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK**


19. A fragile state is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. Fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states. The distinction among them is rarely clear, as fragile states do not travel a predictable path to failure or recovery. The United States has a long history of assisting other nations by providing humanitarian aid, development assistance, free trade agreements, or military assistance. Commanders use the fragile states framework to understand how far and quickly a state is moving from or toward stability.

## **STABILITY FRAMEWORK**

20. The stability framework refers to the range of failed, failing, and recovering states. The distinction among them is rarely clear, as fragile states do not travel a predictable path to failure or recovery. This framework encompasses the stability tasks performed by military and civilian actors across the range of military operations. It guides the understanding of the effort and commitment necessary to shape activities during military engagement to prevent conflict and to support a nation torn by conflict or disaster. The phases of the framework are initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.

21. When applied, the stability framework helps commanders identify the types and ranges of tasks performed in the phases and identify lead responsibilities and priorities. The framework is not linear in that forces can perform tasks concurrently. Military

operations conducted across this framework vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity. See figure 3. (For a more detailed discussion, see ADRP 3-07.)



**Figure 3. The stability framework**

## END STATE CONDITIONS FOR STABILITY IN OPERATIONS

22. Five broad conditions describe the desired end state of successful stability tasks conducted during unified land operations. In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to these end state conditions. Commanders base all these conditions on local norms rather than external norms. However, commanders avoid implementing activities in support of these conditions until they identify and prioritize the local sources of instability.

23. These conditions provide the underpinnings for strategic, whole-of-government planning as well as serve as a focal point for integrating operational- and tactical-level tasks. The end state conditions are flexible and adaptive enough to support activities across the range of military operations but rely on concrete principles and fundamentals in application. The end state conditions are—

- A safe and secure environment.
- Established rule of law.
- Social well-being.
- Stable governance.
- A sustainable economy.

### Safe and Secure Environment

24. A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence. This end is of particular and immediate concern for the military. Establishing a safe and secure environment is essential for implementing the diplomatic, economic, and informational programs that target the sources of conflict and instability.



## **Established Rule of Law**

25. Established rule of law refers to the condition in which all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are accountable to the law. Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, trigger instability.

## **Social Well-Being**

26. Social well-being is the condition in which the population believes its basic human needs are met and people coexist peacefully. Examples include equal access to and delivery of basic needs services (water, food, shelter, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of social fabric and community life.

## **Stable Governance**

27. Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Such interests include the representative participatory decisionmaking processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. Stable governance refers to a condition where the state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power, government officials are held accountable, popular participation is guaranteed, and the population views the state as legitimate.

## **Sustainable Economy**

28. A sustainable economy is one in which the population can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. It is characterized by active competition policies, rule of law, rules that encourage trade and investment, and sound fiscal and monetary policies. This economy is distinguished by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment. This end state includes the existence of a functioning infrastructure.


# **STABILITY IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS**

29. The central idea of unified land operations is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. See figure 4.

## **UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS**

30. The operating concept of unified land operations reflects the fundamental nature of the Army contribution to operations conducted outside the United States and its territories. The concept of unified land operations describes how the Army seizes,

retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Army forces employ synchronized action—nonlethal and lethal—proportionate to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all relevant aspects of an operational environment. Commanders carefully balance offensive and defensive tasks with stability tasks to create an environment that accomplishes the national objectives.



**Figure 4. Decisive action outside the United States**

### Offensive and Defensive Tasks

31. Offensive and defensive tasks emphasize employing the lethal effects of combat power against an enemy force, yet they are also critical to success in some operations emphasizing stability tasks. Offensive tasks compel the enemy to react, creating or revealing weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. Defensive tasks counter the offensive actions of enemy or adversary forces.

### Stability Across the Range of Military Operations

32. Army forces use five primary stability tasks in combination with offensive and defensive tasks in unified land operations. (See paragraph 45 for stability tasks.) Stability tasks are important to operations conducted before, during, and after conflict. Before conflict, engagements with fragile states act as preventative measures, and reinforce alliances or demonstrate support for more stable countries. Army forces conduct these engagements as part of a whole-of-government approach involving other instruments of national power. During conflict, stability tasks help to set post-conflict conditions and mitigate the sources of instability that foster the conflict. Commanders consider the results of lethal or destructive actions on the post-conflict environment. Actions taken during conflict assist the force in seizing the initiative to set the conditions for post-conflict phases of stability. Simply implementing nonlethal activities does not foster stability. Activities target the sources of instability to lay the foundation for long-term stability. After conflict, stability tasks dominate operations as they foster enduring stability. In peacetime, stability tasks are often the critical element of decisive action supporting such missions as peace operations (specifically conflict prevention), and building local capability and capacity (most often in the form of security cooperation). During military engagement, security cooperation, and

deterrence missions, stability tasks play an important role in operations conducted to support the theater campaign plan objectives and support the individual country teams' objectives.

33. During crisis response and limited contingency operations outside the United States, the balance of stability and combat tasks varies with the circumstances. Some crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance, require few offensive and defensive tasks. Others, such as some other types of peace operations, require a delicate balance of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks throughout the operation (see JP 3-07).

34. An exclusive or predominant focus on offensive and defensive tasks in earlier phases of a major operation and campaign often limits appropriate development of follow-on phases and, ultimately, strategic success. The balance of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks sets the conditions for both current and follow-on operations. Successful commanders envision what will happen next and execute accordingly. Even while sustained combat operations continue, the host nation will need established or restored civil security and control as well as humanitarian relief as forces occupy, bypass, or return areas to a transitional authority or host-nation control (see paragraph 36).

35. After achieving major combat objectives in major operations and campaigns, stability tasks receive a greater focus. When applying the stability framework in a post-conflict environment, initial response activities dominate stability tasks. Army forces determine the activities by working to identify local sources of instability. Army commanders work with the host nation and government and nongovernment entities to identify these sources of instability, which if not addressed often lead to violence. After identifying sources of instability, commanders foster a unity of effort with these entities. The tasks focus on establishing civil security to protect both the force and the civilian population, and meeting the humanitarian needs of civilians affected by war. Simultaneously, the commander maintains the momentum of the operation to support the restoration of essential services and repair, and the protection of critical infrastructure, if the security situation permits.

36. Stability tasks support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. Stability tasks leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. Through stability tasks, military forces help to set the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving conflict transformation. These tasks also support the efforts of a legitimate government faced with an inability to maintain security and control due to capacity shortfalls.

## **Initiative**

37. Success in stability tasks depends on military forces seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to anticipate sources of instability and acting positively in

support of a comprehensive approach. By acting quickly and mitigating sources of instability, military forces improve the security situation, retard deterioration of the institution and infrastructure, and create a space for civilian agencies, organizations, and the host nation to work. Commanders still consider political and resource constraints on the use of military force. Further, they make determinations to act within the framework of a conflict assessment and nest actions in a broader strategy to transform the conflict.

38. In a whole-of-government approach, commanders identify and prioritize critical objectives that need immediate attention. When other agencies, organizations, and the host nation lack a capability, commanders collaborate with them to provide military expertise. Such objectives often include consistent actions to ensure effective governance, support reconstruction projects that promote social well-being, and work with the host nation to improve public safety. All these objectives contribute to retaining the initiative, preventing the enemy or adversary from gaining an advantage, and positively influencing the neutrals.

## **TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS AND STABILITY TASKS IN DECISIVE ACTION**

39. Tenets of unified land operations and the stability tasks in decisive action consist of flexibility, integration, adaptability, depth, synchronization, and lethality. (See ADRP 3-07.)

## **MINIMUM-ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS**

40. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When not possible, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the host nation is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risks they can accept.

## **LINKING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EFFORTS**

41. Military forces and civilians have developed series of tasks. The basic military and civilian tasks taken together create an approach that forms the basis for developing lines of effort. The lines of effort underpin an integrated approach to stability tasks based on unity of effort. The approach ensures that the efforts of military forces are integral to broader stabilization activities. Military forces and civilians unite their efforts in the pursuit of a common goal and shared understanding of the desired end state. A clear delineation and understanding of the formal lines of authority enhance unity of effort. Together with the activities of the other participants, these tasks contribute to unity of effort with the diverse array of actors involved in any collaborative effort.

## Department of State Stability Sectors

42. The Department of State (DOS) is designated to coordinate USG efforts in stability operations. To that end, the DOS developed a detailed matrix of stability-focused, essential tasks in support of the stability sectors. This matrix is an evolving interagency document enabling planners to identify specific requirements to support conflict transformation. It serves as a detailed planning tool and applies across the range of military operations. However, the matrix is designed as a starting point to help frame analysis of a stabilization and reconstruction activity, not as a checklist or as a comprehensive analysis tool.

43. The matrix divides the tasks into the following five areas:

- Security.
- Justice and reconciliation.
- Humanitarian and social well-being.
- Governance and participation.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.

## Joint Stability Functions

44. *Stability operations* is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Joint doctrine has established five joint stability functions. These distinct, yet interrelated, military tasks include the five primary Army stability tasks. The joint functions are security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation.

## PRIMARY ARMY STABILITY TASKS

45. Army units conduct five primary stability tasks. These tasks support efforts that encompass both military and nonmilitary efforts generally required to achieve stability. These tasks are similar to and nested with the joint functions and DOS stability sectors. Taken together, they provide a base for linking the execution of activities among the instruments of national and international power as part of unified action.

### **Primary Army Stability Tasks**

- Establish civil security
- Establish civil control
- Restore essential services
- Support to governance
- Support to economic and infrastructure development

46. None of these primary tasks is performed in isolation. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. In any operation, the primary stability tasks—and the subordinate tasks included in each area—integrate with offensive and defensive tasks in unified land operations.

47. The primary stability tasks are fundamental to unified land operations and are conducted across the range of military operations. Commanders can execute the tasks before, during, or after conflict to support a legitimate host-nation government, to assist a fragile state, or in the absence of a functioning civil authority.

48. The Army's primary stability tasks of "Establish Civil Security" and "Restore Essential Services" contain the minimum-essential stability tasks (introduced in paragraph 40).

### ***Establish Civil Security***

49. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing civil security provides needed space for host-nation and civil agencies and organizations to work toward sustained peace. The host nation cannot achieve security solely through the presence of military forces or just by killing or capturing enemies. The objective aims not to defeat or destroy an enemy but to neutralize threats to a stable society to better establish or reestablish competent host-nation security forces. In the absence of civil capability to establish a safe and secure environment, Army forces often assume greater responsibility for security tasks. Ultimately, Army forces transition these tasks to the host nation once it establishes its capabilities.

50. Stability tasks integrate with successfully professionalizing host-nation security forces. Professionalizing includes selecting, training, advising, mentoring, supporting, and providing institutional development to the forces. Often training covers human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection, and the prevention of gender-based violence. The security sector reestablishes its credibility in the eyes of the public and the international community, especially if the conflict implicated the security forces. Incidents of poor discipline, inappropriate standards, accelerated induction, or strained resources instigate a return to conflict. Ultimately, professionalizing the security sector aims for civilian control of the military. Professionalizing is not simply about rebuilding troop levels and training military forces. It is also about reconstructing and developing the security sector's armed and unarmed elements as well as its civilianized governance structures.

### ***Establish Civil Control***

51. Establishing civil control supports efforts to institute rule of law and stable, effective governance. Civil control relates to public order—the domain of the police and other law enforcement agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons (known as the Rule of Law sector). Public disorder significantly threatens law and order and therefore the overall effort to establish a secure, stable peace. In the absence of civil capacity, Army forces often take a more active role to establish civil control. Civil control supports a holistic approach to strengthening rule of law. It supports the development of appropriate laws and capacity building of other agencies for rule of law including institutions that manage justice (for example, ministries), police and other law enforcement agencies, prosecuting authorities, public defenders offices, courts, prisons, oversight bodies, law reform agencies, legal education institutions.



### *Restore Essential Services*

52. The restoration of essential services in a fragile environment is essential toward achieving stability. The basic functions of local governance stop during conflict and other disasters. Initially, military forces lead efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until forces restore local civil services. Military forces follow the lead of other USG agencies, particularly United States Agency for International Development, in the long restoration of essential services. In many cases, local or international development and humanitarian organizations are already established in theater and can fulfill this function.

### *Support to Governance*

53. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. Military efforts to support governance focus on restoring public administration and resuming public services. These services include but are not limited to supporting transitional administration if established, supporting the development of local governance, supporting anticorruption initiatives, and supporting elections.

### *Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development*

54. Military efforts to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a host nation often exhibits stress and ultimately fractures as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the host nation's ability to provide for the well-being of its people. Economic problems inextricably connect to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others likely follow.

55. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. It focuses on the society's physical aspects that enable the host nation's economic viability. These physical aspects of infrastructure include construction services, engineering, and physical infrastructure.

## **UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS**

56. Some types of operations have a greater focus on stability tasks than others. ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 discuss these operations further. In many instances, Army forces concentrate on stability. ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 highlight the following functions, tasks, missions, and operations:

- Military role in prevention activities.
- Security cooperation.
- Peace operations.

- Transitions.
- Security sector reform.
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Foreign internal defense.
- Counterinsurgency.

57. In the conduct of stability tasks, commanders consider the following activities:

- Inform and influence activities in stability.
- Protection of civilians.
- Lethal and nonlethal actions.
- Intelligence.

## **PLANNING FOR STABILITY IN OPERATIONS**

58. *Planning* is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps commanders understand and develop solutions to problems resulting in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

### **STABILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

59. Operations focused on maintaining or reestablishing stability are often protracted and involve numerous military and civilian organizations. The multifaceted drivers of instability are difficult to identify. In addition to the fundamentals of planning described in ADP 5-0, when planning for stability commanders and staffs—

- Recognize complexity.
- Balance resources, capabilities, and activities.
- Recognize planning horizons.
- Avoid planning pitfalls.

### **THE COMMANDER'S ROLE IN PLANNING**

60. Commanders are the most important participants in effective planning. They focus the planning effort by providing their commander's intent, issuing planning guidance, and making decisions throughout the planning process. Commanders apply discipline to the planning process to meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, level of detail, and desired outcomes. Through personal involvement, commanders ensure the plan reflects their commander's intent. Commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing during planning.

## OPERATIONAL ART AND STABILITY IN OPERATIONS

61. Planning for stability draws on all elements of operational art. However, certain elements have more relevance than others do, and some in particular are essential to successful stability tasks. (ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 discuss the operational art.)

### End State and Conditions

62. To achieve the desired end state, stability tasks capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security, foster a sense of national unity, and create the conditions that enable the host-nation government to reassume civic responsibilities. Commanders conduct all stability tasks within the framework of conflict transformation, intended either to address a driver of conflict or to promote a mitigator of violence.

### Lines of Effort

63. A *line of effort* is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential in stability tasks, where physical, positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In these operations, where the human dimension typically becomes the focus of the force, lines of effort often work best to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state. Lines of effort enable commanders to visualize how military capabilities support other instruments of national power. However, commanders base lines of effort on local sources of instability. Otherwise they become prescriptive and do not adhere to the principle of top-down guidance and bottom-up refinement inherent in the planning process. Commanders use lines of effort to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces, civilian agencies, and other organizations.

### Decisive Points

64. A *decisive point* is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). In operations with a greater focus on stability tasks, commanders identify the decisive points that most directly influence the end state conditions, mitigate sources of instability, and foster long-term stability. In these operations, decisive points may be less tangible, may be more closely associated with important events and conditions, and typically relate to the human dimension of the problem. Examples include—

- Securing national borders.
- Repairing a vital water treatment facility.

- Obtaining the political support from key tribal leaders for a transitional authority.
- Establishing a training academy for national security forces.

None of these examples is purely physical. Nonetheless, any may be vital to establishing conditions for transitioning to civil authority.

## **OPERATIONAL APPROACH**

65. Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an operational environment with the problem analyzed through the Army design methodology. This understanding enables commanders to develop an operational approach to guide the force in establishing those conditions for lasting success. Commanders use common doctrinal terms to visualize and describe their operational approach. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.

66. The operational approach conceptualizes the commander's visualization for establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Operations conducted among the people accept military interaction with the local populace as part of the mission. In those operations, the most effective operational approach achieves decisive results through combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms. While the stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, the defeat mechanisms allow the commander to focus the coercive capabilities of the force to provide security and public order and safety for the local populace.

67. The conditions of an operational environment ultimately determine the operational approach. During planning, as commanders and staffs frame the problem, they determine the appropriate combination of stability and defeat mechanisms necessary to resolve the situation. This begins the process that ends with an integrated, synchronized plan for an operation that achieves the desired end state. At times, military forces intervene in an unstable situation with an actively violent security environment. In these cases, military forces may initially use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions sufficiently to protect the civil populace. In a relatively benign environment where military forces primarily assist or facilitate civil efforts, stability mechanisms dominate.

## **STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS**

68. Commanders combine stability and defeat mechanisms to develop the operational approach.

### **Stability Mechanisms**

69. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the stability element of unified land operations. A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help to shape the human

dimension of operational environments more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are: compel, control, influence, and support.

## Defeat Mechanisms

70. A *defeat mechanism* is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADRP 3-0). Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. The four defeat mechanisms are: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.

## Combining Defeat and Stability Mechanisms

71. Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing focus in framing complex problems. They offer the conceptual means to solve problems. By combining mechanisms when conducting stability tasks, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms are vital to success, especially in environments where actors may face active opposition.

## FORCE ORGANIZATION

72. Force tailoring and task-organizing are other tools commanders and staff use when planning for stability in operations. (See ADRP 3-07 for a more detailed discussion.)

## ASSESSMENTS

73. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and guides planning and the other activities of the operations process. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating an operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations. Assessment is vital to successful operations characterized by stability tasks.

74. Three measurement tools assist the commander and staff with assessments: measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators. Measures of performance assess proper completion of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness assess progress toward changing the state of an operational environment envisioned in the commander's intent. Indicators are subordinate measures that provide insight into measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. (ADRP 3-07, ADRP 5-0, and JP 3-0 discuss these three tools in detail.)

## **DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK**

75. The District Stability Framework assists planners in identifying and mitigating source of instability. Because of the uniqueness of the stability environment, the interagency District Stability Framework was designed to identify and mitigate source of instability. This framework works as a planning assessment tool and nests into the military decisionmaking process. There are three steps to the District Stability Framework: analysis, design, and monitoring and assessment. (ADRP 3-07 contains more detail on the District Stability Framework.)

## **CONCLUSION**

76. Stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. In particular, identifying and prioritizing the local sources of instability; targeting the sources of instability; and measuring the effectiveness of the activities to stabilize the area. Strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners using both a whole-of-government and a comprehensive approach to accomplish assigned tasks.



# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (\*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|             |                                     |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>ADP</b>  | Army doctrine publication           |
| <b>ADRP</b> | Army doctrine reference publication |
| <b>DA</b>   | Department of the Army              |
| <b>DODI</b> | Department of Defense instruction   |
| <b>DOS</b>  | Department of State                 |
| <b>FM</b>   | field manual                        |
| <b>JP</b>   | joint publication                   |
| <b>U.S.</b> | United States                       |
| <b>USG</b>  | United States Government            |

## SECTION II – TERMS

### **decisive point**

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

### **defeat mechanism**

The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (ADRP 3-0)

### **line of effort**

A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0)

### **operational approach**

A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (JP 5-0)

### **stability mechanism**

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0)

**\*stability tasks**

Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

**unified action**

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**unity of effort**

The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

# References

Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number.

## REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.  
ADRP 1-02. *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*. 31 August 2012.

## RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

## JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online at

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm>

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